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Abstract 
The paper discusses harmonization of unemployment insurance (UI) and 
sickness insurance (SI). The focus is on the difference between the benefit 
ceilings in the two insurance systems that has been shown to affect the beha-
vior among unemployed SI recipients. The four conclusions are: (i) It is dif-
ficult to argue that the design with different benefit ceilings of UI and SI would 
be optimal. (ii) During the study period 1998–2001, unemployed were overrep-
resented among SI recipients. (iii) Some of the overrepresentation is due to the 
different benefit ceilings. Thus, harmonization of the systems is motivated; (iv) 
In a complex system as the Swedish social insurance system, reducing moral 
hazard in one group probably also implies various indirect effects. When 
designing a reform, all insurances should be considered simultaneously. 
 
Keywords: government policies, moral hazard, sickness insurance, unemploy-
ment insurance 
JEL-codes: H51, H55, I18, J65     
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1 Introduction 
It is hardly an exaggeration to claim that absence due to sickness is currently 
one of the hottest topics in Swedish domestic politics. The number of days on 
sickness insurance (SI) benefits has more than doubled since 1997.
1 What 
explains the drastic rise in sickness absence? What can and should be done to 
reduce it? The views differ. Some look for answers among employers and in 
bad working environments; others claim that there has been a change in 
attitudes about work, or that the SI benefits are too generous. Consensus has 
not yet been reached despite the steadily growing number of reports by aca-
demic researchers and government committees. 
Some reports have already indicated that the unemployed are overrepre-
sented among the SI beneficiaries. For part of the unemployed, benefits from 
the SI are more generous than from the unemployment insurance (UI). Can this 
explain the overrepresentation? Thus far only one study (Larsson, 2002) has 
looked at the interplay between UI and SI, suggesting that different benefits do 
increase sick reports among the unemployed. The extent of that effect, how-
ever, is still unknown.  
Nevertheless, these observations have initiated a debate on harmonizing SI 
and UI. Quite soon after the debate arose, in April 2003, the government 
announced a reform for reducing SI benefits for those unemployed who could 
receive higher benefits from SI than UI. It is thus a partial harmonization of the 
two systems, as it only concerns persons initially on UI and not all SI benefi-
ciaries. The new regulations apply from July 1, 2003. The reform may seem 
like a simple solution to the problem, but there are still many question marks 
concerning the implementation, expected effects, and potential further harmo-
nization. Thus, the debate is far from completed.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide substance and structure to that 
debate. It starts with a short description of the current UI and SI systems. In 
short, UI and SI provide income-related benefits with the same marginal repla-
cement rate, 80 percent, up to a ceiling. The ceilings, however, differ so that 
the maximum SI benefit exceeds the maximum UI benefit. An obvious first 
question then is: “Why are the SI and UI systems different?” I approach this 
question by discussing the design of optimal social insurance. In an optimal 
                                                      
1 See official statistics from the National Social Insurance Board, at www.rfv.se/statistics. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  4 
design, all costs for moral hazard, control and administration are taken into 
account. The paper argues that the design with equal marginal replacement 
rates but different ceilings is hardly optimal. Instead, it is probably a result of a 
long history of political compromises. Given that it is not optimal, some har-
monization is motivated. 
The second question of this paper is “What are the behavioral effects of 
different ceilings on the unemployed?” The results from Larsson (2002) 
suggest that unemployed persons do exploit the possibility of receiving higher 
benefits by reporting sick. In this paper, the results in Larsson (2002) are 
elaborated further to derive the extent of this “excess sick report rate”. 
According to the analysis, a reduction of the SI ceiling to the UI ceiling level 
would lead to a 25 percent decrease in SI benefit days among unemployed with 
wages above the UI benefit ceiling.  However, the net cost of excess sick re-
ports depends on whether the SI periods postpone the moment when the 
unemployed finds a job or not. Depending on this, the cost can vary from some 
millions to several hundred millions SEK.  
Third, the paper discusses expected effects of harmonizing the ceilings, 
based on previous theoretical and empirical evidence. First, the partial harmo-
nization that only concerns persons initially on UI is considered. Second, the 
expected effects of reducing the maximum SI benefits or increasing the 
maximum UI benefits for all are discussed. The net effect of various harmo-
nization models depend on how the UI and SI systems interact with other parts 
of the social insurance system.  
The partial harmonization is not necessarily such a simple way to reduce 
moral hazard as expected. First of all, interactions with other parts of the social 
insurance may imply new sources of moral hazard as SI is made less attractive 
for the unemployed. Moreover, the partial reform implies that the SI system 
becomes less uniform, and thus requires increased administration. A general 
harmonization of the ceilings would involve most Swedish workers and thus 
have huge financial and political consequences. In short, a general increase of 
the UI ceiling would be very expensive, whereas it is difficult – if not 
impossible – to gain political acceptance for a large general reduction of the SI 
ceiling. 
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2  Swedish sickness and 
unemployment insurance
2 
SI and UI form an integral part of the compulsory public social insurance in 
Sweden. Benefits from the public social insurance are income-related and for 
the most part financed by taxes. The system, being a part of the Swedish 
Welfare State, can be characterized as general rather than selective. That is, 
most citizens are comprised by the system, and the degree of economic means 
tests in the allocation of rights is low (Rothstein, 2002). Moreover, the Swedish 
system is often perceived as generous in international comparisons.   
 
2.1  Description of sickness insurance  
The purpose of SI is to provide economic maintenance when the worker is too 
sick to work and support himself. Until the reform in July, 2003, the marginal 
replacement rate was 80 percent of the wage prior to the sick period. The 
reform reduced the replacement rate to 77.6 percent. However, there is both a 
lower and an upper limit to the benefits: To receive SI the worker must have 
had a monthly wage of at least SEK 767 per month, which corresponds to 
benefits of SEK 613.
3 Furthermore, SI benefits never exceed 80 percent (77.6 
percent) of SEK 24,125 per month, as illustrated in Section 2.3. 
Basically all employed workers – with a wage above the lower limit – are 
automatically covered by the SI. Students and unemployed workers are also 
eligible for the SI as long as certain conditions are fulfilled. An unemployed 
person, for example, must be registered at a local employment office as job 
seeker. The size of his SI benefits is not based on his UI benefits but his wage 
before unemployment. Thus, unemployed persons without previous employ-
ment do not receive SI benefits. 
SI is administered by 21 local social insurance offices and financed by 
general state taxes. Some of the tax revenue is collected from the employers 
through social insurance fees. Employers also pay their employees’ sickness 
                                                      
2 This section describes the UI and SI systems as they were until the reform of SI July 1, 2003. 
The reform implied mainly two changes: the replacement ratio was reduced from 80 percent to 
77.6 percent, and the ceiling for the maximum SI benefits for unemployed was reduced. The 
latter change is discussed in more detail in Section 5. 
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compensation during the first 14 days of sickness.
4 The workers’ tax bill 
includes a general contribution to the social insurance, as well. 
Besides the replacement rate below 100 percent, the SI system contains two 
instruments to prevent unjustified absence. First, the insured person must visit a 
doctor within seven days of sickness in order to receive additional compensa-
tion after the first week. Again after four weeks, a doctor’s certificate must be 
provided to the SI authorities. Unjustified absence shorter than one week is 
made less attractive by the absence of any compensation for the first day of 
sickness. 
 
2.2  Description of unemployment insurance  
The purpose of UI is to insure against involuntary unemployment. Benefits 
from the UI are either income-related or fixed, depending on the person’s work 
history. For income-related benefits, the unemployed has to fulfill three 
conditions
5: 
•  The basic condition that the unemployed is available for vacant jobs. In 
practice, this means that he has to be registered at an employment 
office as a job seeker and that he is willing to accept a job. 
•  The membership condition that the unemployed has been a member of 
an UI fund for at least 12 months prior to unemployment. Membership 
is voluntary. 
•  The working condition that the unemployed has to have worked at least 
six months during the last twelve month period. 
If the unemployed has been a member of an UI fund for shorter period than a 
year but still fulfills the other two conditions, he is entitled to the fixed basic 
amount of compensation. This is the case also if he fulfills the first two but not 
the working condition, given that he has recently completed full-time studies. 
UI benefits are time-limited to 60 weeks, corresponding to 300 benefit days. 
These benefit days can be received either continuously or with breaks in the 
unemployment period. The person can qualify for a new period of 300 benefit 
days during a break by re-fulfilling the working condition. If he has not done 
that by the end of the 300 benefit day period, the employment officer will 
assess his need of intensified counseling. If such need is found, he will be 
assigned into a labor market program called activity guarantee, which implies 
                                                      
4 Except for the first day of sickness that is uncompensated. 
5 For a detailed description, see e.g. the web-page at www.aea.se. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  7 
that he is offered intensive counseling and the entire spectrum of services and 
labor market programs available to job seekers at the employment offices.  
The activity guarantee is a full-time activity. The participants receive 
compensation equal to UI benefits. If the unemployed refuses to participate in 
the program, UI benefits will expire. If no need for intensified counseling is 
found, the employed gets entitled to UI benefits for another 300 day period.
6  
This possibility exists one time only. 
Similar to the SI benefits until July, 2003, the income-related UI benefits are 
80 percent of previous earnings.
7 There is a lower and an upper limit to the UI 
benefits, as well. The fixed basic amount of SEK 7,400 (≈ € 790) per month 
constitutes the minimum, corresponding to 80 percent of a monthly wage of 
SEK 9,250. The upper limit varies depending on how long the person has been 
unemployed. During the first 100 days of unemployment, the maximum 
benefits are 80 percent of a monthly wage of SEK 20,075. After that, the ceil-
ing is reduced to 80 percent of SEK 18,700. Figure 1 in Section 2.3 illustrates. 
UI is administered by 39 unemployment insurance funds representing 
workers from different occupational groups.
8 All together, the UI funds have 
approximately 3.8 million members, corresponding to 86 percent of the work 
force and 67 percent of the adult population. The funds are formally inde-
pendent, but they must be officially approved by the state and follow common 
regulations in order to receive the state grant. The main source of finance for 
the UI benefits is the state grant, rest is financed by membership fees.
9  
The UI funds closely cooperate with the local employment offices, 
especially in controlling whether the unemployed fulfill the rules concerning 
job search. The unemployed person has to meet his employment officer 
                                                      
6 There are no formal guidelines for the employment officer’s assessment on this issue. The 
unemployed person’s education, previous work experience and unemployment history play 
presumably a role. For a Swedish description of activity guarantee, see Fröberg & Persson, 2002. 
7 However, in the UI system earnings are defined somewhat differently than in the SI system. 
Somewhat simplified, the UI benefits are based on the worker’s average earnings during the past 
six months. The SI benefits are based on the estimated earnings the worker would have had 
during the sickness spell. 
8 Including the ALFA fund that is not associated to any workers’ union. Furthermore, the ALFA 
fund pays unemployment compensation to persons who are not members of any UI fund. 
9 In 2002, the total bill for UI benefits (including administration costs) was SEK 23.8 billion 
(≈ € 2.55 billion, February, 2004), of which 17.5 percent was financed by membership fees. 
(Discussion with Peter Skönefeld at the UI funds’ Central Organization, 9 May, 2003.) IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  8 
regularly and he is obliged to apply for any job the officer assigns him.
10 If not, 
the employment officer must write a report to the UI fund, which then decides 
on a suitable sanction. In short, either the unemployed is suspended from the 
UI benefit, or his benefits are reduced. These sanctions are time-limited or 
permanent, depending on whether the person has broken against the rules 
before, and the expected duration of the employment he refuses to accept.  
The first five days of involuntary unemployment are uncompensated. If the 
unemployment is voluntary – i.e. if the person has left his job without a valid 
reason or if he has been laid off because of improper behavior – the 
uncompensated period is up to 45 weekdays.  
 
2.3  Interaction of sickness and unemployment insurance 
Broadly, the UI and SI systems look very much the same: They have similar 
purposes, namely to insure against an “accident”; they cover most of the adult 
population; they are mostly financed by general state taxes; they provide 
income-related benefits with the same marginal replacement rate; and they 
contain monitoring instruments to prevent unjustified use of the benefits. 
Differences appear at a closer look. The beneficiary groups do indeed 
largely overlap, but the principle for coverage differs. SI is a compulsory 
insurance in that it automatically comprises persons with earnings above the 
(very low) minimum level, whereas UI is a voluntary insurance. They are also 
administered by different authorities with different organizational principles 
and traditions. Furthermore, monitoring instruments, sanctions, time-limits for 
maximum benefit duration, and the benefit ceilings are different. 
Some of these differences may affect the incentives to switch from UI to SI 
(or vice versa). In the present paper, the focus is on the benefit ceilings. Figure 
1 illustrates the benefit size from UI and SI as described above. The marginal 
replacement rate is indeed the same, 80 percent, but the different floors and 
ceilings imply that, for many individuals, benefits from UI and SI are not 
identical.  
                                                      
10 The unemployed person is not obliged to accept any job in order to receive further UI benefits. 
Family situation, the duration of unemployment and other factors are taken into account in the 
judgement. There is also a distinction between the employment officer suggesting and assigning 
a job: in the former case the unemployed is allowed to reject the offer without sanctions. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  9 
 
Figure 1 UI and SI benefits in May 2003 
A. Days 6–100 of unemployment 
 
 
B. Days 101–300 of unemployment 
 
 
Note: SEK 100 equals to about € 10.7 (February 2004).  
 
Unequal ceilings imply that it is more advantageous for persons with monthly 
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previous earnings exceed the UI benefit ceiling have an incentive to report sick. 
Similarly, persons with monthly wages below the UI floor receive more from 
UI than from SI. 
Another difference that has been shown to affect the unemployed concerns 
the formal time-limits for maximum benefit duration. UI benefits are limited to 
300 days, whereas SI benefits can in principle be received forever.
11 In 
practice, though, the time-limit of UI is not strict, as it is possible to receive a 
new period of 300 UI benefit days instead of participating in activity guarantee. 
Nevertheless, Larsson (2002) shows that the probability of reporting sick in-
creases as the UI benefit expiration date approaches. One plausible explanation 
is that the unemployed person reserves his UI benefits and postpones the expi-
ration date by reporting sick and thus receiving SI instead.  
 
 
3  Why are the systems different? 
3.1  Designing an optimal social insurance 
In a standard economics textbook insurance model, the demand for insurance 
arises as risk-averse individuals are exposed to a risk of (income) loss. Risk 
aversion means that the individuals prefer a safe outcome to a gamble. In such 
a situation, utility maximizing individuals choose a full insurance against the 
risk. In perfect competition and with perfect information, insurance companies 
are willing to provide full insurance for an actuarially fair rate that equals the 
individual’s risk. We would thus observe voluntary full insurance, i.e. replace-
ment ratios of 100 percent, against both unemployment and sickness. 
However, the underlying assumptions of the model are seldom fulfilled in 
the real world where full insurance is more of an exception than a rule. First of 
all, the model requires perfect information. In reality, the accident risk varies 
among individuals, and the insurer cannot observe the individual risk. On a 
private insurance market, this asymmetry would lead to adverse selection. The 
insurances companies would have to base their rates on the “worst-case” 
forecasts, and consequently only the “worst-case” individuals would purchase 
                                                      
11 In practice, however, persons who are too sick to return to their jobs eventually switch to 
disability pension. In 2001, the average length of a SI period prior to a disability pension period 
was 685 days. (Source: National Social Insurance Board) 
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these insurances. A compulsory insurance solves this problem as all individuals 
are forced to purchase the insurance and the rate can be based on the average 
incidence of accident. Thus, adverse selection provides a rationale for the com-
pulsory social insurance.
12  
Another problem with asymmetric information is moral hazard. It means 
that the existence of insurance causes individuals to change their behavior 
towards greater risk, thus increasing their use of insurance. Moral hazard can 
be reduced by reducing the insurance generosity or by increasing the control. In 
fact, if perfect monitoring of the insurance applicants was possible, no moral 
hazard would occur. However, perfect monitoring is seldom an option as it is 
very expensive and difficult to implement. Consequently, uncompensated days, 
replacement rates below 100 percent, and limited duration of the benefit 
periods are cheaper and easier ways to reduce moral hazard. Theoretical and 
empirical evidence of the relationship between moral hazard and the generosity 
of UI and SI is presented in more detail in the following sections. 
Designing a socially optimal social insurance system involves of course 
other aspects than asymmetric information. Values and norms concerning 
income redistribution and a minimum level of maintenance for each citizen 
form the basis of the social insurance system. For example, financing through 
progressive taxes and decreasing marginal replacement rates are ways to level 
out income differences. Furthermore, administrative costs of running an 
insurance system depend on how complex the rules are for e.g. eligibility, 
replacement and premiums. This is an often used argument for a general and 
uniform system instead of a means-tested.
13  
An optimal design is derived from weighing all efficiency and equity (and 
other) aspects together. The bottom line is that in an optimal system, all costs 
for moral hazard, control and administration are taken into account. Thus, some 
moral hazard may indeed exist in an optimal system as it is weighed against 
monitoring, administration, income redistribution, etc. This leads us to the next 
                                                      
12 As described in the previous section, SI in Sweden is compulsory whereas UI is formally 
voluntary. However, the design of the state-subsidized UI is so generous that it is clearly advan-
tageous for basically every worker to be a member.  
13 The very fundamental question is whether the society should provide any social insurance at 
all. The political, economic and philosophical arguments for and against a publicly provided 
welfare system are numerous. Asymmetric information, as discussed in the previous section, is 
one example. However, the rest of this paper presupposes the existence of Government 
subsidized social insurance. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  12
question on whether the design of UI and SI as illustrated in Figure 1 can be 
regarded as optimal. 
 
3.2  Can different UI and SI ceilings be optimal? 
Let us consider two alternative optimal designs of UI and SI. Both presume that 
the marginal replacement rate is less than 100 percent because of moral hazard 
among the benefit recipients. Furthermore, high-income earners are assumed to 
be more inclined to increase their risk of sickness or unemployment due to 
generous insurance than low-income earners. Thus, the average replacement 
rate is decreasing.
14  
Figure 2A illustrates a first possible optimal design based on these 
assumptions. The individuals’ risk behavior is assumed to be as sensitive to the 
generosity of UI as of SI, so the benefit-wage profile is identical in UI and SI. 
Another optimal design is illustrated in Figure 2B. Here it is assumed that 
the individuals’ risk behavior is more sensitive to the generosity of UI than to 
SI. That is, high UI benefits cause more moral hazard than high SI benefits. 
The average replacement rate of UI is then lower than of SI, ceteris paribus¸ 
for all wages. Alternatively, we could assume that monitoring whether 
unemployment is voluntary or not is more costly than monitoring a persons’ 
health status. Thus, to allow the same amount of moral hazard in UI and SI 
systems for the same monitoring cost, the benefit-wage profile of UI must be 
flatter than that of SI. Third, the society might simply be willing to allow for 
more moral hazard among the sick than among the unemployed. Nevertheless, 
the optimal average replacement rate from SI is constantly higher than from UI. 
                                                      
14 Taslimi (2003) derives an optimal wage-UI benefit profile from a search model framework 
with heterogeneous workers. According to his results, the optimal average replacement rate is 
decreasing. Fredriksson & Holmlund (2003) discuss other efficiency aspects of designing 
optimal unemployment insurance. 
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Figure 2 Two possible designs of SI and UI 
 
 
Can the design in Figure 1 with same constant marginal replacement rates up 
to different ceilings ever be regarded as an approximation of some of the 
optimal designs in Figure 2? Most likely not. A constant replacement rate up to 
a ceiling per se may be an approximation of the designs in Figure 2, as it 
makes the system more uniform and simple to administrate than a continuously 
decreasing replacement rate. But an approximation of Figure 2A would be a 
design with same (constant) replacement rates up to same ceilings, whereas an 
approximation of Figure 2B would imply different (constant) replacement rates 
up to different ceilings.  
The present design with same (constant) marginal replacement rates up to 
different ceilings looks like a mixture of these two, and it is very difficult to 
find a rationale for such a design. It presumes that low-income earners are as 
sensitive to UI and SI generosity, but high-income earners are more sensitive to 
UI than SI generosity. 
Moreover, it is not likely that Figure 2B illustrates an optimal design since it 
implies incentives for the unemployed to report sick. Recall that an optimal 
design presumes that all costs for moral hazard etc are regarded. That means 
that even moral hazard among unemployed SI recipients would be taken into 
account, which seems unrealistic.  
Benefit 
Wage  Wage 
Benefit 
SI = UI 
2A: Identical SI and UI  2B: Different SI and UI 
SI  
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It seems likely that the present design is a result of a long history of political 
compromises rather than an optimal design. A glance at the UI and SI history 
gives the impression that the systems emerged and developed quite separately 
(though during the same time period), and that the interplay between the two 
systems has not been an issue when designing them. From the very beginning, 
they have differed in some details and been identical in other respects.
15 The 
numerous reforms during the 20
th century have not, at least not systematically, 
strived for harmonizing the systems. 
In sum, if there is no rationale for the UI and SI systems to be different, 
harmonization is motivated given that it moves us closer to the optimal design. 
However, in a complex system as the Swedish social insurance, reducing moral 
hazard in one group of individuals may increase moral hazard in another group, 
or increase the administration cost. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis of various 
harmonization alternatives should take into account the net changes in moral 




4  Behavioral effects of different 
ceilings 
The study by Larsson (2002) suggests that unemployed whose previous wage 
exceeds the UI ceiling report sick more often than they would if the ceilings 
were the same. In other words, different ceilings do seem to cause moral hazard 
among the unemployed. Here, the word moral hazard comprises even pure 
misuse of the system. However, the study does not find any incentive effect 
that increases the average length of the sick period. That is, unemployed who 
can benefit from reporting sick do it more often but not for longer periods. A 
possible interpretation is that the requirement of doctors’ certificate after all 
makes it difficult to stay on SI for more than one week if not truly sick. 
Larsson (2002) is based on data for the period 1998–1999.
16 Before going 
into more detail in describing the analysis in that study, let us look at more 
                                                      
15 Lindqvist (1990) is a nice overview of SI history in Sweden. Marklund (1982) describes the 
history of both UI and SI in European countries, including Sweden, and the USA.  
16 Data from 1997 were also used to control for sickness and unemployment history. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  15 
recent data on SI spells among the unemployed. This will serve two purposes. 
First, the data give an indication on how common it is that unemployed 
individuals report sick. Second, we can apply the results from Larsson (2002) 
to estimate how much moral hazard the different benefit ceilings caused during 
the period 1998–2001.  
 
4.1 The  data 
Larsson (2002) and the present paper use the same data sources. Information on 
the individuals’ UI spells is collected from UI funds’ register database 
(AKSTAT). Information on the SI spells is collected from the sickness period 
register (sjukfallsregister), administered by the National Social Insurance 
Board. These registers are matched within the LINDA database (Longitudinal 
INdividual DAtabase) that is a 3.35 percent representative sample of the 
Swedish population.
17 LINDA includes a rich set of individual characteristics. 
UI and SI records are matched annually. In other words, SI spells in 1998 
are matched to UI spells in 1998. Start and end dates for all UI and SI spells are 
observed. The combined data set includes all individuals who received either 
UI or SI benefits during the year. Thus, the data set shows the extent of insured 
openly unemployed among the SI recipients during that year. Similar combined 
data sets are constructed for 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
Henceforth, unemployed refers to individuals observed in the UI statistics 
sometimes during the calendar year. SI recipients are individuals observed in 
the SI statistics. A SI recipient is defined as an unemployed SI recipient if he 
switches from UI to SI or vice versa. That is, the SI spell must be either 
preceded or followed by an UI spell.
18  
  
                                                      
17 For a detailed description of LINDA, see Edin & Fredriksson (2000). Larsson (2002) includes 
a detailed description of UI and SI data. 
18 Since the data are not matched over calendar years, the stock of unemployed in January each 
year is somewhat incorrectly defined. Only those SI recipients in the stock in January 1 whose SI 
spells are followed by an UI spell are defined as unemployed SI recipients. Some of the SI 
recipients in the stock are thus falsely defined as ‘not unemployed’ as I do not observe their 
preceding UI spell during the previous year. Thus, the number of unemployed SI recipients may 
be downward biased if based on the stock. For this reason most of the descriptive statistics are 
based on the inflow of unemployed instead which is not associated with this problem. 
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4.2  Sick spells among unemployed 1998–2001  
Let us start by looking at how many of all SI recipients are unemployed. Figure 
3 defines the unemployment rate among SI recipients as the number of all 
unemployed individuals starting a sick spell during the year, divided by all 
individuals starting a sick spell. During the study period, this rate was twice as 
high as the official open unemployment rate in the economy. Moreover, the 
data in Figure 3 suggests that among unemployed the probability of reporting 
sick is approximately four times higher than the overall probability of reporting 
sick among all insured. 
19 
                                                      
19 Note that the unemployment rate among SI recipients is based on inflow of new SI recipients, 
whereas the official open unemployment rate reports the average stock of unemployed divided 
by the average work force during a year. However, the data in Figure 3 can be used to estimate 
the relationship between the probabilities of reporting sick among the unemployed and in the 
population. Consider the following notation: 
p = probability of reporting sick among (insured) unemployed,  
q = overall probability of reporting sick, 
T = the number of sick reports among unemployed,  
N = the total number of sick reports, 
U = the number of unemployed,  
L = labor force. 
The curves in Figure 3 show T/N (upper) and U/L (lower). Let us assume (quite realistically), 
that 70 percent of all unemployed are insured, and that the number of individuals covered by the 
SI is 1.25 times the labor force. Thus, T/N can be written as T/N = [p* 0.7*U]/[q*1,25*L], 
implying p/q = (T/N)(1.25/0.7)(L/U). According to Figure 3, T/N = 0.089 and U/L = 0.04 in 
2001. Consequently, p/q = 3.97. The probability of reporting sick is four times higher among the 
unemployed than in the population.   IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  17 
 
Figure 3 Unemployment rate in the annual inflow of SI recipients and in the 
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Unemployment rate among SI recipients, only SI spells > 14 
days included
Open unemployment rate 
 
Note: Unemployment rate among SI recipients a calendar year is defined as: the 
number of unemployed persons who start a SI spell longer than 14 days during the 
calendar year / the total number of persons who start a SI spell longer than 14 days 
during the calendar year. Open unemployment rate is collected from the Labor Force 
Survey 1998–2001. 
 
Figure 4 shows another estimate of the overall sick report rate among 
unemployed, as compared to all insured. The continuous line relates the 
number of individuals, who some time during the calendar year start a SI spell, 
to the average population of insured during the year. Similarly, the dashed line 
relates the number of unemployed individuals starting a SI spell to the average 
stock of unemployed during the year. Both these lines only include individuals 
starting a sick spell longer than 14 days.
20  
                                                      
20 Recall from the description in Section 2 that employers pay for the first 14 days of an 
employee’s sick period. Thus, sick periods shorter than 15 days of employed individuals do not 
show up in the data. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  18
Unemployed clearly seem to be overrepresented among the SI recipients. The 
share of SI recipients was 1.8–2.3 times higher among unemployed than in the 
population. Furthermore, during the period 1998–2001, sick report rate has 
risen more among unemployed than in other groups. Finally, the line with 
triangles line in Figure 4 includes even short SI spells among the unemployed 
showing that, each year, 25–33 percent of the average stock of unemployed 
received SI benefits for some period. 
 
Figure 4 Inflow of SI recipients in the population and among unemployed, only 
SI spells longer than 14 days included (continuous and dashed lines) and all SI 
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SI recipients when SI spell > 14 days / stock of insured
Unemployed SI recipients / stock of unemployed
Unemployed SI recipients when SI spell > 14 days/ stock of unemployed
 
Note: The numerator is defined as the sum of persons with a SI spell starting Jan 1 –
 Dec 31 each year. Unemployed SI recipients are defined as persons whose SI spells 
are in connection to an UI spell, either before or after. The denominator “stock of 
insured” is defined as 3.35 percent (LINDA sample size) of the average annual work 
force by the Labor Force Survey (AKU) times 1.25, as the number of insured is 
approximately 25 percent greater than the labor force. The denominator “stock of 
unemployed” is defined as the annual average of the stock of UI recipients each week 
in the AKSTAT database. 
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What about the length of SI spells among unemployed as compared to other SI 
recipients? According to a report by the National Social Insurance Board (RFV 
– Riksförsäkringsverket, 2003), SI spells in 2001 were on average 1.5 times 
longer among unemployed than among employed.
21 For comparability, I have 
applied a similar sampling method to study the average SI spell length in the 
matched UI and SI data.
22  
Table 1 reports the results. Note that, as in the above figures, the 
unemployed are compared to the entire sample of SI recipients (including 
unemployed) instead of employed as in RFV (2003).
23 The SI spells were 
longer among unemployed only in 2001. The difference, however, is not as 
large as in RFV (2003).  
 
Table 1 SI spell lengths among unemployed and all SI recipients, inflow 
February 1–16 1998–2001 
  All SI recipients  Unemployed SI recipients 
 Mean  SI  Median  N  Mean  Median  N 
1998 125,0  69  613  103,2  56  99 
1999 90,6  37  1073  84,9  35  77 
2000 106,7  46  1116  101,4  46  95 
2001 102,4  45  1100  116,0  54  87 
Note: The samples of all SI recipients include persons who start a SI spell February 1–
16. Only spells longer than 14 days are included.  
 
In sum, while unemployed clearly were overrepresented among SI recipients 
during the whole study period 1998–2001, their SI spells were not longer than 
the average spells among all SI recipients. Of course, the overrepresentation 
may be due to demographic differences between the groups, stress caused by 
unemployment, or other factors. Nevertheless, some of it may be explained by 
                                                      
21 See Table 3 in RFV (2003). 
22 As in the RFV study, the sample in Table 1 includes all SI spells starting February 1-16. 
However, the observation windows differ somewhat: in my data all spells that last longer than 
until December 31 are censored, whereas RFV (2003) observes the spells until March 1 the 
following year. Thus, the mean of the SI spell lengths is smaller in my data. 
23 SI recipients who are not unemployed are not necessarily employed. For example, they can be 
students or participate in some active labor market program. Thus, it would not be correct to 
exclude the unemployed from the sample of all SI recipients and call the rest employed. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  20
the design of the UI and SI systems. The next step is to see how much. In other 
words, how large is the excess sick report rate due to different benefit ceilings?  
 
4.3  Excess sick reports due to different ceilings 
The conclusion in Larsson (2002) – that unemployed who can benefit from 
reporting sick do it more often but not for longer periods – is based on results 
from a duration analysis. Appendix A discusses the method in more detail but, 
in short, the basic idea is to estimate probabilities of reporting sick for each 
point in time. The question is “What is the probability of reporting sick after 2 
(or 4, 6, etc) weeks of unemployment, conditional on that the individual is still 
unemployed after 2 (or 4, 6, etc) weeks?”. A rich set of control variables, such 
as age, gender, education, and sickness and unemployment history, is included 
in the estimations. The results show that, among individuals who can benefit 
from reporting sick, all these probabilities are higher when the ceilings are dif-
ferent than they would be if the ceilings were the same.   
To determine the effect of different ceilings in the entire sample, we must 
aggregate the conditional probabilities. Moreover, the estimated aggregate sick 
report probability must be compared to the hypothetical situation where the UI 
and SI ceilings are identical. Such an analysis (see the Appendix) suggests that, 
on average, sick report rates would have been 25 percent lower among the 
middle- and high-wage unemployed if the SI ceiling was as low as the UI 
ceiling. In other words, the different benefit ceilings cause an excess sick report 
rate of approximately one third in that group.  
What does this figure mean in terms of SI expenditure? That is, how much 
do the excess sick reports cost each year? First, the answer depends on the 
wage distribution among unemployed SI recipients and the length of their SI 
spells. The fewer middle- and high-wage unemployed there are among SI 
recipients, and the shorter their SI spells, the smaller is the cost of moral 
hazard.  
Given that the number of SI recipients would be 25 percent lower but the SI 
spells would be as long, the annual sum of SI days would be 25 percent lower 
among the middle- and high-wage unemployed. We can thus obtain an approxi-
mation of the cost of excess sick reports for the period 1998–2001 by using the 
descriptive data in Table 2. It comprises all unemployed SI recipients for each 
four calendar years. That is, the populations consist of all unemployed IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  21 
individuals who had an ongoing SI spell sometime during the calendar year.
24 




Table 2 Wage distribution among unemployed SI recipients and annual SI 
statistics, 1998–2001. (Figures in parentheses report shares of total population) 
 Annual  stock  1998 








No of individuals  2,304 (76 %) 657 (22 %) 71 (2 %) 3,032 
Annual SI days  54 60 71 56 
 Annual  stock  1999 
No of individuals  1,825 (69 % ) 760 (29 %) 76 (3 %) 2,661 
Annual SI days  61 72 52 64 
 Annual  stock  2000 
No of individuals  1,578 (62 % ) 859 (34 % ) 96 (4 % ) 2,533 
Annual SI days  68 73 84 70 
 Annual  stock  2001 
No of individuals  1,855 (83 %) 290 (13 %) 93 (4 %) 2,238 
Annual SI days  76 81 88 77 
Note: The population each year consists of both the stock of SI recipients 1 January and 
the inflow of new SI recipients during the year. However, the stock may be an 
underestimate of the true stock, see footnote 18.  
 
Second, the cost of excess sick reports depends on what these individuals 
would have done instead had they not received SI benefits. In other words, 
would they have received UI benefits for some or all of the period? If not, the 
cost of excess sick reports is determined by the amount of their SI benefits. If 
yes, the cost is determined by the difference between their UI and SI benefits. 
Two examples illustrate. 
Consider first an example where SI postpones the moment the average un-
employed person finds a job. When the SI ceiling is higher than the UI ceiling, 
the person (with wage above the UI ceiling) reports sick after 50 days’ of 
                                                      
24 Both the inflow of new SI recipients and the stock in the beginning of the calendar year are 
included. 
25 All SI spells during the calendar year are counted even if only one of them is connected to an 
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unemployment. He stays sick for 20 days and receives SI for 19 days. After 
that, it takes 40 days for him to find a job. Thus, the time until employment is 
50+20+40=110. When SI ceiling is equal to UI ceiling, he stays on UI for 
50+40=90 days. In this case, an estimate of the cost of excess sick reports can 
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where the denominator refers to the LINDA sample size of 3.35 percent of the 
entire Swedish population.
26 In 1998 the cost according to formula (1) was 
approximately SEK 156 million; in 1999 SEK 206 million; in 2000 SEK 252 
million; and in 2001 SEK 127 million.
27 This is the maximum cost of excess 
sick reports.  
Now consider another example where it does not matter whether or not the 
unemployed receives SI for some period(s). He finds a job as quickly – after 90 
days in the above example – in any case. Now the cost is determined by the 
difference between the SI bill and the UI bill for the 20 days that the person is 
on SI. Using the descriptive data in Table 2, we can calculate the minimum cost 
of excess sick reports: SEK 17.2 million in 1998; SEK 22.4 million in 1999; 
SEK 30.7 million in 2000; and SEK 11.0 million in 2001. 
In sum, the cost of moral hazard due to the different benefit ceilings was 
somewhere between SEK 11 and 127 million in 2001. Is this little or much? 
Related to the total Government expenditure for SI, SEK 36,700 million in 
                                                      
26 The average number of SI spells and thus the number of uncompensated days is assumed to be 
two. The average daily benefits for 1998-2001 respectively were approximated to be: SEK 473 
(wage between the UI and SI ceilings) and SEK 598; 476 and 598; 477 and 602; 533 and 606. In 
the wage category between the ceilings, the figures were calculated by: 1/365*(12*average wage 
in the category*0.8). In the wage category above the SI, the figures were calculated by: 
1/365*(12*SI ceiling wage*0.8). 
27 Expressed in euros, the cost was 16.7 million; 22.0 million; 27.0 million; and 13.6 million 
(February 2004). The relatively low figure for the last year is due to the UI reform in 2001 that 
increased the UI ceiling for the first 100 days of unemployment. In the calculation I have used 
the higher UI benefit ceiling. 
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2001, it may seem little. But we should relate it to the total expenditure of our 
population of unemployed SI recipients in Table 2. Then it corresponds to 2–25 
percent of the expenditure. Thus, moral hazard is potentially very costly. 
 
5  Consequences of harmonizing the 
ceilings 
Thus far, I have shown that moral hazard due to different UI and SI ceilings is 
potentially very expensive. However, altering the ceilings may be associated 
with other costs. This section looks closer into potential incentive effects and 
other consequences that arise when the ceilings are altered. Both a partial and a 
general harmonization are discussed. Partial harmonization refers to the reform 
from July 1, 2003, that equalized the ceilings only for the unemployed persons. 
A general harmonization alters the ceilings for all workers.  
 
5.1  How many people are affected? 
To start with, let us see how many people are affected if some or both of the 
ceilings are altered. Table 3 shows descriptive wage data for the stock of UI 
recipients, SI recipients, and the work force. Table 2 in the previous section 
shows the wage distribution among unemployed SI recipients. 
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Table 3 Income distributions in the stock of UI and SI recipients and in the work 
force, 1998–2001, nominal terms 
 1998 















UI recipients  0.64 0.32 0.04  
SI recipients  0.65 0.29 0.05  









UI recipients  0.59 0.36 0.05  
SI recipients  0.58 0.35 0.07  









UI recipients  0.54 0.41 0.05  
SI recipients  0.52 0.39 0.09  
Work force  0.27 0.53 0.21  
 2001 

















UI recipients  0.50 0.27 0.17 0.06 
SI recipients  0.46 0.24 0.20 0.11 
Work force  0.20 0.28 0.28 0.25 
Note: The wage distribution among UI recipients each year is determined as the mean 
of wage distributions in weekly stocks in the UI funds’ register. Only persons who have 
received income-related UI benefits are included. The wage distribution among SI 
recipients is determined as the mean of wage distributions in monthly stocks in the SI 
register. The wage variables underlying the distribution among UI and SI recipients are 
thus slightly different. The wage distribution in the work force is obtained from 
Statistics Sweden wage statistics (Lönestatistisk Årsbok).  IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  25 
 
In the short run, changes of the UI and SI ceilings will affect persons who 
receive these benefits. Thus, the size of these populations is interesting when 
determining the immediate effect of a harmonization – for example the SI or UI 
expenditure saving. Of course, if the harmonization only applies to unemployed 
SI recipients, they define the population of interest.  
In the long run, however, more people than those initially on the benefits are 
affected as a changed benefit structure alters the incentives to use the benefit. 
Consequently, the wage distribution in the work force is interesting when deter-
mining the moral hazard effect of a harmonization or the political possibilities 
to implement the harmonization.  
Table 3 shows that the wage distributions among the UI and SI recipients 
and in the work force differ quite dramatically. In the two benefit recipient 
groups, the share above the (lowest) UI ceiling increased from approximately 
one third to a half during the period 1998–2001. In the work force, almost 60 
percent had a wage above the UI ceiling already in 1998. In 2001, the share 
was 80 percent. Consequently, all general changes in the benefit ceilings would 
affect large groups immediately, and up to 80 percent of the work force in the 
long run. 
 
5.2  Partial harmonization of the ceilings 
The reform of 1 July, 2003, decreased the SI benefit ceiling for unemployed SI 
recipients. The new SI ceiling equals the higher UI ceiling that is valid during 
the first 100 days of unemployment, see Figure 1. That is, the maximum 
monthly SI benefit decreased from SEK 19,300 to SEK 16,060.  
Given the 2001 wage distribution shown in Table 2, this reform 
immediately affects 17 percent of the unemployed SI recipients. The SI bene-
fits of unemployed in the highest wage category, 4 percent of the population, 
decrease by approximately SEK 107 per day. For unemployed with wages 
between the old and the new ceiling, the decrease is smaller and depends on 
their previous wages. In 2001, a corresponding reform would have led to an 
immediate SI expenditure saving of approximately SEK  57  million among 
openly unemployed UI recipients. Based on the data in this paper, a very 
conservative estimate for the entire unemployed population in 2003 is IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  26
approximately SEK  110 million.
28 The long-run saving is larger as moral 
hazard decreases. 
The reform may thus seem as an easy way to reduce Government expendi-
ture and moral hazard. However, there are at least four issues that might make 
this reform less effective than expected. First, it makes the SI system less 
uniform. The literature on administration and implementation of public policies 
includes good arguments for general, uniform policies. Selective and means-
tested policies demand more control and imply borderline cases. Adminis-
tration of such policies easily gets very heavy.
29 In our case, different ceilings 
for unemployed and others requires more control of the SI recipients’ labor 
market status to make sure that everybody receives correct SI benefits.  
Second, new incentives to switch status on the labor market arise. It be-
comes more advantageous to report sick when employed than when unem-
ployed. Persons who risk unemployment or whose temporary employment is 
about to end may thus report sick before they get unemployed. In that case we 
will observe increased flows from employment to SI.
30 Furthermore, interaction 
between UI and SI is hardly the only interaction within the social insurance 
system. As SI becomes less generous, other insurances may get relatively more 
attractive. Palme & Svensson (2003) provides some evidence of interaction 
between UI, SI, and early retirement pensions. Parent’s insurance to take care 
of a sick child is another example of insurance schemes that may get relatively 
more attractive. 
Third, we should not expect moral hazard among unemployed SI recipients 
to decrease drastically until all the differences between the UI and SI systems 
are harmonized. After all, different ceilings are not the only source of moral 
hazard among unemployed SI recipients. Larsson (2002) shows that the proba-
                                                      
28 This figure is based on the assumption that the population of unemployed in this paper is 
approximately 63 percent of the entire unemployed population including program participants. 
63 percent corresponds to the share of openly unemployed of all unemployed in statistics from 
National Labor Market Board. Furthermore, I have assumed that program participants have SI 
spells similar to those in Table 2. Thus, the estimated saving in 2001 is SEK 90 million. 
Assuming that the SI expenditures of the unemployed has followed the average SI expenditure 
growth rate of 25 percent, the estimated figure for 2003 would be SEK 113 million. 
29 For a discussion, see e.g. Rothstein (2002). 
30 According to the new rules, persons who get unemployed during their SI period must report it 
to the local social insurance office in order to get their SI benefits reduced. Obviously, incentives 
not to report it are strong. Controls and sanctions are needed, which in turn will increase the 
administration costs of running the system. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  27 
bility of reporting sick increases as the UI benefit expiration approaches. When 
receiving SI, unemployed people “preserve” their UI benefits, thus postponing 
the expiration date. So even if the ceilings are harmonized the unemployed still 
have incentives to report sick. Furthermore, the fact that SI benefits are paid for 
7 days and UI benefits for 5 days per week implies that sickness periods that 
last over a weekend are attractive for all unemployed irrespective of previous 
wage. 
Even after the reform, many unemployed can receive higher benefits from 
SI than from UI. Unemployed persons who are not entitled to income-related 
UI benefits, who are suspended from UI, who receive reduced UI due to 
refused work offers, or who have been unemployed for more than 100 days are 
examples of such cases.   
Fourth, besides the public UI and SI benefits, many unemployed receive 
benefits from contractual insurances against sickness and unemployment. 
These insurances are regulated by collective agreements between unions and 
employers’ organizations. A survey of various contractual insurances by 
Adolphson (2003) shows that it can still be clearly profitable for a high-wage 
unemployed to report sick even if the public UI and SI ceilings are harmonized. 
Some of the high-wage unemployed receive considerably higher contractual 
benefit from SI than from UI. 
 
5.3  General harmonization of the ceilings 
The UI and SI ceilings remain different for most insured after the partial 
reform. Section 3 showed that a design with identical replacement ratios but 
different ceilings is hardly optimal.
31 Even though the purpose of this paper not 
is to speculate on exactly what the optimal design looks like, some general 
harmonization of the ceilings may be a step to right direction. Such a 
harmonization implies either that the SI ceiling is decreased or the UI ceiling 
increased (or both), for all insured.  
To begin with the expected moral hazard effects of such a harmonization, 
let us look at how benefit generosity affects unemployment or absence due to 
sickness in the economy. In short, the results from the international literature 
suggest that more generous UI benefits increase the average length of unem-
                                                      
31 The recent reform that decreased the replacement ration of SI from 80 percent to 77.6 percent 
makes it even harder to motivate the design as it now implies that SI has a lower replacement 
ratio but a higher ceiling than UI. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  28
ployment periods and the number of unemployed in the economy. Similarly, 
higher SI benefits increase both the incidence and the duration of sickness 
periods. 
Since 1970s, search theory provides the most common theoretical tool to 
study the effect of UI on unemployment.
32 In search models, the expected 
duration of unemployment is determined by the (unemployed) individual’s 
search activity and the labor market situation. An unemployment period ends 
the sooner, the more vacancies there are available, the more actively the 
individual seeks for a job, and the less choosy he is to accept a job. The size of 
the UI benefits affects above all the tendency to accept a job offer: the higher 
the benefits, the choosier the unemployed individual. Of course, if the employ-
ment service authorities are very efficient in “forcing” the unemployed to 
accept any job offer the size of the UI benefits are of less importance.
33 
Moreover, other aspects of the UI benefits, such as the duration of benefits or 
sanctions, are shown to affect the unemployment duration. 
Krueger and Meyer (2001) is the most recent international survey of the 
empirical evidence on how UI benefit generosity affects unemployment.
34 They 
summarize the international literature as follows:  
 
“An elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benefits of 0.5 is not 
an unreasonable rough summary, though there is a wide range of estimates in 
the literature.” 
 
                                                      
32 The first search theoretical models are presented in Mortensen (1977) and Burdett (1979). For 
surveys of both theoretical and empirical evidence up to late 1990s, see Atkinson & 
Micklewright (1991) and Holmlund (1998).  
33 It can be shown in the search theoretical framework that higher benefits may also reduce the 
duration of unemployment among non-insured individuals. In Sweden, as in many other 
countries, an individual qualifies for UI benefits through work experience. Higher UI benefits 
make it more attractive to take a job and thus qualify for the benefits. 
34 They also provide a discussion on identification of the UI effects. In cross sectional studies the 
effect of UI benefits is identified by regressing the duration of unemployment on the replacement 
ratio that in turn is determined by previous wage and other individual characteristics. It is thus 
difficult to compare two identical individuals with different replacement ratios. Consequently, 
the estimated effect may not necessarily show any causal relationship. Studies where 
identification is based on regional variation (such as across U.S. states) or some partial reform 
that changes the replacement ratio for some but not all individuals are thus more reliable. Carling 
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The results from early Swedish studies provide some support to these results 
(see Björklund, 1978, and Björklund & Holmlund, 1989). However, a recent 
study by Carling et al (2001) suggests stronger effects. They analyze the reform 
in 1996 when the replacement ratio was decreased from 80 percent to 75 per-
cent. The fact that the reduction only affected individuals with earnings below 
the UI ceiling (the ceiling was not altered) implies that the groups above the 
ceiling can be used a control group. They estimate an elasticity of 1.6: a 10 per-
cent increase in UI benefits is associated with a 16 percent increase in the un-
employment duration. The standard error of the estimate is quite large, though.  
Higher UI benefits may also increase the number of unemployed. One po-
tential mechanism is through wages: higher UI benefits lead to higher wages 
and thus lower employment. Holmlund (1989), Forslund (1992), and Holmlund 
& Kolm (1995) are examples of Swedish studies analyzing the effect of UI be-
nefits on wages and providing some support for the hypothesis. However, iden-
tification of the causal effect is somewhat complicated as wages more or less 
perfectly determine the size of the benefits. Krueger & Meyer (2001) provide a 
survey on U.S. studies. Their conclusion is that the elasticity of UI claims with 
respect to UI benefits is approximately 0.5. Thus, an increase in the UI benefits 
by 10 percent would lead to a 5 percent increase in the number of UI recipients. 
However, the institutional setting in the U.S. differs quite from the Swedish, 
and thus the mechanisms through which UI generosity affects the number of 
unemployed differ as well. Consequently, one should be careful with 
generalizing the Krueger & Meyer (2001) estimates to the Swedish context. 
Similar to the UI literature, the literature on SI provides evidence of strong 
incentive effects: higher SI benefits increase both the incidence and the dura-
tion of sickness periods. Theoretical studies have traditionally analyzed 
sickness as absence from work in the labor supply framework. In these models, 
absence from work emerges in a situation where the employment contract 
obliges the worker to supply a certain amount of labor that exceeds the 
worker’s optimal labor supply. The worker maximizes his utility over income 
and leisure under income and time constraints. Absence is associated with a 
cost in terms of lost income: the lower the SI benefits, the higher the losts of 
income.
35  
                                                      
35 Examples of such models and empirical applications are provided by Allen (1981), Barmby, 
Orme and Treble (1991), Barmby, Sessions and Treble (1994) and Brown and Sessions (1996). 
Currie and Madrian (1999) summarize international research on the subject.  IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  30
In such a framework, it is straightforward to show that an increase in the SI 
benefits leads to more absence from work. Higher benefits imply a lower cost 
associated with absence and alters thus the worker’s budget constraint. Given 
that leisure is a normal good, this leads to a decrease in the optimal labor 
supply of the worker. Consequently, the incidence and the duration of absence 
increase. 
Empirical studies confirm this theoretical result. Broström et al (2002), 
Henrekson & Persson (2004), and Johansson & Palme (1996 and 2002) present 
Swedish evidence that higher SI benefits are associated with more sickness 
absence. For example, in a Swedish summary of their 2002 paper Johansson 
and Palme calculate the elasticity of sickness incidence with respect to benefits 
to be 0.5 for males and slightly higher for females. They do not however find 
any evidence that the size of SI benefits would significantly affect the length of 
the SI periods. (Johansson & Palme, 2003) 
In sum, the moral hazard literature seems to suggest that an increase of the 
UI benefit ceiling would increase equilibrium unemployment, whereas a 
reduction of the SI ceiling would decrease equilibrium absence due to sickness. 
The groups affected by these reforms would be large. Thus, increasing the UI 
ceiling would imply that both the daily UI benefits and the number of benefit 
days increase for approximately 50 percent of the entire population of UI 
recipients. Moreover, even if the percentage increase in the number of new 
unemployed would be moderate, the absolute increase could still be 
considerable as 80 percent of the work force have wages above the UI ceiling 
(Figures for 2001 in Table 3).
36 Similarly, decreasing the SI ceiling would save 
a lot both in terms of reduced SI expenditure per day and reduced number of 
days for more than half of the entire SI recipient population. 
Thus, a reduction of the SI ceiling is a much cheaper harmonization than an 
increase of the UI ceiling. The administration costs of such general reforms 
hardly differ either; both should be quite low. However, most question marks 
                                                      
36 Consider the following example: If the UI benefit ceiling was increased to equal the SI ceiling, 
at most the increase would be 29 percent (from SEK 14,960 to 19,300 per month) for individuals 
with earnings equal or above the SI ceiling. According to the Carling et al (2001) estimate, their 
expected unemployment duration would then increase by 46 percent. The Krueger & Meyer 
(2001) estimate would imply a 14.5 percent increase in the unemployment duration. Assuming 
that the average length of unemployment is 6 months, the increase at most would thus be 4 to 12 
weeks. The expected increase would naturally be smaller for individuals with earnings closer to 
the UI ceiling.  
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associated with a partial reform also concern these general reforms. For 
example, interactions between SI and other social insurances – such as early 
retirement pensions or parents’ insurance – may imply that these other insu-
rances are utilized considerably more when SI is made less generous. More-
over, a real harmonization of the ceilings is not reached until the contractual 
insurances are harmonized, which is difficult for the government to decide on.  
Decreased absence from work is not necessarily all that efficient. If the wor-
kers attend their job sick, their productivity may be lower. However, there is no 
evidence that “sick-presence” would increase when benefits are decreased. 
Last but certainly not least, the wage distribution in the work force does not 
only affect whether the reforms are economically possible and motivated. It is 
important from a political perspective, as well. Harmonizing the ceilings by 
reducing the SI ceiling to equal the UI ceiling would concern a vast majority of 
all workers. Whether such a reform is politically feasible or not is, of course, 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
 
 
6 Concluding  remarks 
Harmonization of the social insurance is not a new topic in the political debate. 
In March 1993, some of the leading economist and political scientists in 
Sweden, known as the “Lindbeck Commission”, published a report on how to 
improve the Swedish economy. Among many other things, the authors 
emphasized the need of reforms within the social insurance system. They 
already at that point in time noticed the problem of interactions between 
various insurances due to different benefit levels, and argued for as uniform 
systems as possible.
37  
Today, ten years after the report, many of the differences in benefit genero-
sity still remain. It is thus interesting to see whether the present harmonization 
debate leads to more comprehensive reforms. My aim with this paper has been 
to contribute to the debate by bringing out facts about the part of the social in-
surance system that I know most about, namely unemployment and sickness 
insurance. These two insurances are interesting to discuss also because of the 
recent reform that harmonizes the replacement ratios for the unemployed.  
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The conclusions from this paper are: First, the design of UI and SI with 
equal replacement ratios but different benefit ceilings is hardly optimal. An 
optimal system weighs the cost of moral hazard against the cost of monitoring, 
administration etc. However, in our case it is difficult to argue that the moral 
hazard among unemployed SI recipients would be optimal. 
Second, statistics from the period 1998–2001 show clearly that unemployed 
are overrepresented among SI recipients. It is not obvious, however, that their 
SI spells are much longer than on average. 
Third, results from Larsson (2002) applied to the data in this paper suggest 
that moral hazard among unemployed SI recipients due to different benefit 
ceilings potentially has been very costly. Consequently, some harmonization at 
least among the unemployed is motivated.  
Fourth, reducing moral hazard in some parts of the social insurance is 
seldom a free lunch when the system is as complex as the Swedish. UI and SI 
are hardly the only social insurances that interact. Altering the generosity of UI 
and SI not only alters the use of those insurances, but implies also indirect 
effects on the use of other insurances. Thus, reforming only some of the 
insurances but leaving the others unaltered does not necessarily lead to desired 
effects. When designing a reform, all insurances should be considered simulta-
neously. 
Finally, general reforms that alter the benefit ceilings for all insured concern 
many people as most workers have a wage above the UI ceiling. Realization of 
such reforms may thus be politically difficult. Progressive taxes together with 
benefit ceilings imply that the financial burden of UI and SI already today is 
relatively much heavier for persons with wage above the ceiling than below it. 
Moreover, the average financial burden has gotten heavier during the past 
years, as wages have increased more than the ceilings have been raised. An im-
portant condition for a legitimate system is that citizens perceive the financial 
burden as fair. Thus, a reduction of the SI ceiling would probably be perceived 
as unfair, and such a reform would unlikely appear as politically feasible.  
The question of legitimacy is of course more complex than that. Alarming 
reports about misuse of social insurance benefits may undermine the legitimacy 
of the existing system. If so, some reforms are necessary to prevent a collapse 
of the citizens’ confidence in the long run. Solidarity on the tax payers’ side 
requires solidarity of the beneficiaries. 
The system must not only be perceived as legitimate among the voters but 
also among the implementing authorities. If they do not agree with the rules IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  33 
and regulations, the system may turn out to be entirely different in practice than 
on paper. The authorities must of course be well acquainted with the rules in 
order to implement them, as well. The more complicated the system, the higher 
the risk of misinterpretation and misuse. Bad implementation may imply a 
legitimacy problem among the citizens as their confidence in the 
implementation process collapses. A successful reform concerning UI and SI 
requires thus that all implementing authorities – employment offices, UI funds, 
local social insurance offices, the medical profession, and the National Labor 
Market Board and the National Social Insurance Board on the top – find it fair 
and support it. IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  34
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Appendix A 
Identification of the incentive effect in Larsson (2002) 
The strong connection between income and health, as documented in a series of 
studies, makes it difficult to identify the effect of differing benefit ceilings.
38 
Higher income is shown to correlate with better health, thereby implying a 
lower probability of sickness. There are several potential explanations to this. 
High wage earners may have healthier living habits, or employers may discri-
minate against individuals with bad health and offer them lower wages. 
Nevertheless, this positive correlation between wages and health would imply 
that individuals with previous wages above the UI ceiling have a lower 
probability of being on SI instead of UI. The incentive effect due to different 
ceiling, in turn, implies that individuals with previous wages above the UI 
ceiling have a higher probability of being on SI instead of UI. Thus, wages are 
expected to have two opposite effects on the probability of being on SI.  
Larsson (2002) applies non-parametric discrete hazard models to estimate 
sick report rates and length of the sick period. The incentive effect of wages is 
separated from the health effect by estimating the effect of wages on the sick 
report probability separately for the three wage categories: previous wage 
below the UI ceiling (group I), between the UI and SI ceilings (group II), and 
above the SI ceiling (group III). In groups I and III, a change in wage does not 
alter the difference between SI and UI benefits, whereas in group II, the 
difference increases as wage increases. Same approach is used to estimate the 
length of the sick period.    
The results show that, in groups I and III, wage has a significantly negative 
effect on the hazard rate into sickness, reflecting the health effect. In group II, 
however, the effect of wage on the hazard rate into sickness is significantly 
positive. The positive incentive effect is thus strong since it dominates the 
negative health effect.   
 
Calculation of the excess sick report rate due to moral hazard 
We can derive the incentive effect on the overall probability to report sick from 
the hazard estimates for each time interval. The question is: How much (less) 
                                                      
38 For a summary of studies concerning the interplay between health and labor market outcomes, 
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would the unemployed with wages above the UI ceiling report sick if the SI 
ceiling was as low as the UI ceiling? This hypothetical experiment is illustrated 
in Figure A1. 
 




First, I use the parameter estimates in Larsson (2002) to estimate the hazard 
for each individual with wage above the UI ceiling and for each time interval. 
Low-wage individuals are excluded since their sick report rate is assumed to 
remain unaltered. The individual probability of reporting sick within the total 
time period is obtained from equation A1: 
 
() ( ) t
t




1 ,      (A1) 
 
where  ht is the estimated individual hazard for time interval t. Aggregating 
these individual probabilities gives us an estimate of the overall sickness proba-
bility when the ceilings are different.  
Then, I apply the exact same procedure but use the hypothetical parameter 
estimates for the wage effect when the ceilings are the same. As a result, I 
obtain an estimate of what the sickness probability would be if the SI ceiling 
Sickness 
probability 
 Different ceilings    Same (low) ceilings 
UI ceiling  SI ceiling  Previous wage 
Sickness 
probability 
Previous wage  UI and SI ceiling 
Decreased sickness 
probability IFAU – Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance  40
was as low as the UI ceiling. The percentage effect of lowering the SI ceiling is 










.     (A2) 
 
The results  () 25 . 0 − ≈ ∆ sick P  means that, on average, sick report rate would 
have been 25 percent lower among the middle- and high-wage unemployed if 
the SI ceiling was as low as the UI ceiling. 
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